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In a two-stage procurement model, we compare two types of ﬁxed-price con-
tracting schemes, bundling and unbundling. The buyer’s choice of scheme involves
an intertemporal tradeoﬀ: providing incentives for cost-reducing investment and
sharing production-cost risk between the risk-neutral buyer and the risk-averse
supplier. The main result shows that unbundling outperforms bundling when both
the supplier and the entrant in ex post competitive bidding confront an aggregate
risk, and the externality of the supplier’s investment on the entrant’s production
cost is low.
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11 Introduction
There are two typical issues in procurement contracting: how to provide investment
incentives with a contractor and how to share risk between contracting parties. In
plant or building construction, a large company or a public ofﬁcial contracts with
a contractor. The contractor’s investment in design speciﬁcations at an early stage
can reduce costs in the subsequent construction stages through innovative ideas.
The exact amount of construction costs is determined only at a later stage, depend-
ing on various exogenous factors such as the availability of subcontractors or price
ﬂuctuations for raw materials, and thus is uncertain at the early stage. The perfor-
mance of a contract can often be assessed by its effect on these two issues.
While the result in the moral-hazard literature demonstrates the effective-
ness of cost-sharing contracts, simple ﬁxed-price contracts are more pervasive in
many industries and countries.1 In public-sector procurement, the Federal Acquisi-
tion Rules (FARs) in the U.S. bind the public entities to award ﬁxed-price contracts
by competitive bidding. In private-sector procurement, the ﬁxed-price contracts
called “lump-sum” have historically been prevalent. There are many plant engi-
neering ﬁrms which specialize in lump-sum project execution, such as CB&I in the
U.S., JGC Corporation in Japan, and so on. The survey by the Royal Institution
of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) reports that, in 2004, 87.1% of 2330 projects in the
U.K. construction industry used lump-sum contracts, and only 0.2% used cost-plus
contracts (RICS, 2006).2
If a ﬁxed price for entire works is agreed at the outset of a long-term project,
then it provides the contractor with strong incentives for cost-reducing investment,
but imposes most of the risk on the contractor. The relevant contracting schemes
are the ones called “lump-sum turnkey” or “design and build” in the construction
industry.3 The bankruptcy of a major U.S. engineering ﬁrm, Stone & Webster, in
2000 was attributed to the lump-sum turnkey projects (Engineering News-Record,
2000).
Alternatively, in a multi-stage project, tasks can be split into several con-
tracts to be awarded sequentially as the project information and design develop, as
1Bajari and Tadelis (2001) argue that ﬁxed-price contracts, which have no need to measure actual
construction costs, will dominate a larger set of cost-sharing contracts as it becomes more expensive
to measure costs. They, however, compare the performance of ﬁxed-price contracts with that of cost-
plus contracts, focusing on the tradeoff between cost-reducing incentives and renegotiation costs.
2Cost-sharing contracts (including cost-plus contracts) are less pervasive in European countries
or Japan than in the U.S. Albano, Calzolari, Dini, Iossa, and Spagnolo (2006) argue that unreliability
of accounting data may induce the procurer to choose a ﬁxed-price contract that does not rely on
information produced by the contractor.
3There are many design-build ﬁrms, which undertake the tasks of both design and construction.
Engineering News-Record (ENR) annually reports the top 100 design-build ﬁrms (ENR, 2010).suggested by Navarrete (1995). For example, a purchaser of a petrochemical plant
initially awards the Front End Engineering Design (FEED) contract to a contractor
at a ﬁxed price, and then awards the Engineering, Procurement, and Construction
(EPC) contract to the contractor selected via competitive bidding at a ﬁxed price.
A contractor who is awarded the FEED contract also frequently wins the EPC con-
tract. The scheme “design-bid-build”, which is traditionally used in the building
construction industry, is the similar one. These alternative schemes can reallocate
risk between the purchaser and the contractor, but may lessen the contractor’s ex
ante investment incentives because the schemes allow the purchaser to extract the
beneﬁt of cost reduction in the ex post awarding process.
The aim of this study is to compare two types of ﬁxed-price contracting
schemes, bundling and unbundling, and to derive conditions under which each
scheme is chosen in equilibrium. We develop a model based on the incomplete
contract setting. A risk-neutral buyer (principal) procures a product such as a plant
from a risk-averse supplier (agent).4 Under bundling, the ﬁxed prices of design
speciﬁcations and a product are prespeciﬁed, and then the supplier invests in cost
reduction and produces the product. Under unbundling, the ﬁxed price of only
design speciﬁcations is prespeciﬁed; after the supplier invests and the uncertainty
about production costs is resolved, the buyer awards a production contract via a
ﬁrst-price auction between the supplier and a potential entrant, with the delivered
design speciﬁcations. At the time of auction, the production costs for the supplier
and the entrant are common knowledge between them,5 but the buyer cannot ob-
serve these costs. Note that the supplier’s investment can potentially reduce the
entrant’s production cost. The buyer chooses the efﬁcient contracting scheme in
equilibrium because she can obtain total surplus from trade at the ex ante stage.
The main results are as follows. As one would expect, bundling dominates
unbundling when the supplier is risk-neutral, for risk sharing does not matter. Once
the supplier is risk-averse, unbundling generates higher total surplus than bundling
when both the supplier and the entrant confront aggregate risk in production costs
and the investment externality is low; aggregate risk is deﬁned as the case where
their production costs have a perfect positive correlation and the same variance. On
the other hand, bundling generates higher total surplus than unbundling regardless
of the supplier’s risk aversion when each of the supplier and entrant confronts his
own ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk in production costs; ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk is deﬁned as the case
4In the petroleum industry, large oil companies (e.g., Exxon Mobil) procure new plants from
specialized contractors. Olsen and Osmundsen (2005), who also assume that the supplier is risk-
averse, argue that contractors are less able to carry risk because, for example, their portfolios of
projects are less diversiﬁed.
5We will also analyze the case where the realized values of production costs are their private
information with some assumptions.where their production costs are independent of each other.
We now turn to a review of the related literature. The recent literature on
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) has focused on a comparison between the anal-
ogous schemes (Hart, 2003, Bennett and Iossa, 2006, Maskin and Tirole, 2008,
Martimort and Pouyet, 2008, Chen and Chiu, 2010, Hoppe and Schmitz, 2010).
Contrary to the traditional scheme of public-sector procurement in which two se-
quential tasks of building infrastructures are unbundled and delegated to separate
contractors, the scheme of PPPs has a feature that these tasks are bundled and as-
signed to a single contractor (or a consortium). For instance, in the case of a prison,
it matters whether the two tasks of prison construction and operation should be bun-
dled or not. The above articles compare the performance of bundling (PPPs) with
that of unbundling (traditional procurement). The central issue is how each scheme
affects the suppliers’ incentives for various kinds of investment.6 Martimort and
Pouyet (2008), however, additionally examine a risk-sharing issue in a multitask
model.7 They consider the quality-enhancing investment in the ﬁrst stage and the
cost-reducing effort in the second stage. In an environment where asset quality is
unveriﬁable but operation costs are veriﬁable so that cost-sharing contracts are fea-
sible,8 they investigate conditions under which each organizational form, which is
a combination of the contracting scheme (bundling or unbundling) and the owner-
ship structure, is desirable for the buyer. There are signiﬁcant differences between
the model of Martimort and Pouyet (2008) and ours. First, we examine the risk-
sharing issue in a situation where only ﬁxed-price schemes are feasible. Second we
assume that unbundling allows the supplier to bid for a production contract. Under
unbundling, the supplier wins for sure in equilibrium with his cost advantage, but
the entrant’s bid considerably affects not only investment incentives but also risk
sharing.
Another strand is the literature on “second sourcing” (Anton and Yao, 1987,
Demski, Sappington, and Spiller, 1987, Laffont and Tirole, 1988, Riordan and Sap-
pington, 1989). In the context of the public procurement of defense systems or the
regulation of a natural monopoly, these studies examine a form of competition in
which an incumbent supplier’s technology is transferred to an alternative entrant
(second source), competing for a production contract with the incumbent supplier.
Riordan and Sappington (1989) show that the buyer’s option to switch suppliers
affects the supplier’s investment incentives. Unlike this paper, production is shifted
to the inefﬁcient entrant with positive probability in equilibrium so that the buyer
can limit the supplier’s informational rents. The prospect of lower returns at the
6The effect of an ownership structure of a facility on investment incentives is also an issue (Ben-
nett and Iossa, 2006, Martimort and Pouyet, 2008, Chen and Chiu, 2010).
7In the context of PPPs, risk sharing is also an important practical issue. See OECD (2008).
8They also consider an environment where both quality and operation costs are veriﬁable.production stage in turn reduces the supplier’s incentives in the investment stage.
Laffont and Tirole (1988) analyze the regulator’s switching (or breakout) policy
and its interaction with incentive schemes. They consider an environment where
the supplier’s cost-reducing investment may or may not be transferable to the en-
trant, and their results depend on this condition. With transferable investment, the
supplier underinvests because he has no incentives to internalize the externality.
The regulator then mitigates this inefﬁciency by awarding a production contract to
the supplier with higher probability than the ﬁrst-best (complete information) case.
In this paper, we also show that the existence of the potential entrant causes under-
investment due to the investment externality. Moreover, the potential entrant in the
same industry as the supplier behaves as if the entrant reported a production cost
index through competitive bidding. In the case of aggregate risk, particularly, the
winning price which is equal to the index is positively correlated with the supplier’s
production cost. This risk sharing beneﬁt of second sourcing has not been pointed
out in the literature.
Finally, the literature on incomplete contract has also emphasized invest-
mentincentives(Williamson,1975,1985,GrossmanandHart,1986,HartandMoore,
1990, Hart, 1995). One of the insights is that long-term contracts can enhance efﬁ-
ciencyby fostering relation-speciﬁc investment(Miceli, 2008). In our setting, while
bundling (long-term ﬁxed-price contracting) can prevent opportunistic behavior by
the buyer and resolve the underinvestment problem due to “holdup”, its rigidity
imposes most of the risk on the supplier. Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994)
show that a long-term contract with a complex revelation mechanism achieves ex
ante efﬁciency in a general environment where the supplier make cost-reducing
investment and the buyer make value-enhancing investment, and both parties are
risk-averse. Their mechanism, however, must be committed in an initial contract.9
Assuming that under unbundling the buyer only commits to a ﬁrst-price auction to
award a production contract, we focus on more practical contracting schemes in
procurement.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium outcome and provides the sufﬁ-
cient conditions under which each scheme generates higher surplus than the other.
Section 4 discusses the implications. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the
Appendix.
9Although their mechanism relies on the assumption that the good to be traded is perfectly di-
visible, more complex mechanism may be able to achieve ex ante efﬁciency in our environment.
However, the analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. Remark 2 will discuss the related topic.2 The model
A risk-neutral buyer (principal) B procures one unit of product such as a plant. A
risk-averse supplier (agent) S has a CARA utility function u(p) = 1−exp(−rp),
where p ∈ R and r > 0 is his coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion.10
Valuation v > 0 for the product by B is common knowledge. S invests in de-
sign speciﬁcations before production of the product. With the design speciﬁcations
developed by S, either S or a potential entrant E can produce the product. Invest-
ment a ∈ R+ by S, which has a positive externality on E, reduces the production
costs for both S and E (cS and cE, respectively). Each ci(a;qi) for i = S;E is a func-
tion of both an investment level a and a random variable qi ∈ [q; ¯ q] representing
exogenous factors in the cost. If S chooses an investment level a with investment
cost y(a) and qS is realized, then his total cost is y(a)+cS(a;qS). We make the
following assumptions.





¶a for all a and all qS;qE.
Assumption 3. The investment cost function y : R+ → R+ is twice continuously
differentiable, y′(a) > 0, y′′(a) > 0, lima→0y′(a) = 0, and lima→¥y′(a) = ¥.
Assumption 4. The production cost function ci : R+×[q; ¯ q] → R+ is twice contin-
uously differentiable in a,
¶ci(a;qi)




¶a2 ≥ 0, for all a, all
qi, and all i = S;E.
Assumption 5. ci is strictly increasing in qi for all i = S;E.
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that S has an advantage in production over E.11
Assumption 1 also ensures that trade of the product between B and either supplier
(S or E) generates positive gains. Assumptions 3 and 4 ensure a unique interior
solution for the optimal investment levels. Assumption 5 is almost without loss of
generality.
The procurement game proceeds as follows. At date 0, B chooses between
two contracting schemes: bundling and unbundling. If B selects bundling, then the
game proceeds as follows. At date 1, B offers two ﬁxed prices (p1;p2) ∈ R2 in
exchange for both the design speciﬁcations and the product.12 S then either accepts
10Even if B is also risk-averse, almost all results remain qualitatively unchanged when B has a
CARA utility function and less risk-averse than S.
11The assumption that the entrant’s production cost is always higher than the supplier’s cost may
be justiﬁed by certain learning costs, as suggested by Riordan and Sappington (1989).
12B pays a total price p1 + p2 after both the design speciﬁcations and the product are delivered.
We can assume instead that B pays each price just after S delivers the corresponding object.or rejects the offer. If S rejects the offer, the game ends and B and S obtain their
reservation utilities 0. If S accepts the offer, the game continues. At date 2, S
chooses an investment level a. At date 3, random variables (qS;qE) are realized
and the game ends. If B selects unbundling at date 0, then the game proceeds as
follows. At date 1, B offers a ﬁxed price p1 ∈ R in exchange only for the design
speciﬁcations. The game continues in the same way as for bundling until date
3. At date 4, in a ﬁrst-price auction, S and E simultaneously submit a bid p2 ∈ R
competing for a production contract. The supplier who submits the lowest bid wins;
when both S and E submit the same bid, S wins with his cost advantage. The game
then ends. Figure 1 summarizes the time line.
S and E submit bids in 
a first-price auction. 
(only under unbundling)
Date 0 Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4




B and S sign an 
initial contract.





first stage second stage
E S q q ,
Figure 1: Timeline
The information structure at date 4 is as follows. The investment level a is
knownonlybyS. Therealizedvalueofqi isknownonlybyi=S;E. Theproduction
costs cS(a;qS) and cE(a;qE) are common knowledge between S and E.13 B does
not know these variables at all.14
As will be explained in the next section, under either scheme, S produces
and delivers the product in the equilibrium outcome. Given prices (p1;p2), invest-
ment a, and the realized values of (qS;qE), the payoff for B is UB = v−(p1+ p2)
and that for S is US = 1−exp{−r[(p1+ p2)−y(a)−cS(a;qS)]}.
We assume that investment a, realization of (qS;qE), and production costs
cS(a;qS), cE(a;qE) are unveriﬁable. When B can offer an initial contract in which
prices are contingent on both the investment a and the realized value of qS (or both
the investment a and the production cost cS(a;qS)), the ex ante efﬁcient outcome
is realized, in which (i) B induces S to choose the efﬁcient investment level ˜ a that
13This assumption may be justiﬁed when each contractor can precisely estimate his competitor’s
production cost from the design speciﬁcations included in bidding documents.
14Tirole (1986), who considers the case of military procurement, also assumes that in the incom-
plete contract setting the buyer does not know the supplier’s production cost.minimizes expected total cost y(a)+E[cS(a;qS)],15 and (ii) B pays the realized
total cost y(˜ a)+cS(˜ a;qS) for all qS to S. B then obtains the ﬁrst-best (expected)
payoff v−{y(˜ a)+E[cS(˜ a;qS)]}.
3 Bundling versus unbundling
In this section, we explore the subgame perfect equilibrium of the procurement
game. We focus on the following two cases concerning the degree of correlation
between production costs. Case (i): qS and qE are statistically independent, so
that production costs cS(a;qS) and cE(a;qE) are independent. Case (ii): For any
investment level a, production costs cS(a;qS) and cE(a;qE) have a perfect positive
correlation and the same variance.
The ﬁrst case may be plausible when each of the supplier and entrant con-
fronts his own ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk, such as the availability of his associated subcon-
tractors. The second case may be plausible when both S and E confront aggregate
risk, such as price ﬂuctuations for raw materials for the plant or uncertain buyer
requirements which are only established in the design speciﬁcations.
Note that in any case the equilibrium outcome of a ﬁrst-price auction at
date 4 under unbundling is the same as that of Bertrand competition; in a unique
equilibrium both S and E submit p2 = cE(a;qE) and S wins. Competitive bidding
determines the price p2 as if the production cost for E were veriﬁable. This result,
however, dependsontheassumptionthatbothSandE knoweachother’sproduction
costs. Some remarks are given at the end of the next subsections.
3.1 The case of ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk
In this subsection, we consider case (i). Before examining the equilibrium invest-
ment level, we characterize the risk premium for S. After S delivers the prod-
uct, he obtains proﬁt p = (p1+ p2)−y(a)−cS(a;qS) under bundling with prices
(p1;p2) and proﬁt p′ = (p′
1+ p′
2)−y(a)−cS(a;qS) under unbundling with prices
(p′
1;p′
2 = cE(a;qE)). These proﬁts are random variables. S’s risk premium r > 0
for p is such that his expected utility E[u(p)] is equal to u(E[p]−r). His risk
premium r′ > 0 for p′ is deﬁned in the same way.
Lemma 1. Let r be S’s risk premium for p =(p1+p2)−y(a)−cS(a;qS), and r′ be
that for p′ = (p′
1+cE(a;qE))−y(a)−cS(a;qS). Then, in the case of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
risk, r′ > r > 0 when the same investment level a is chosen under both schemes.
15In this paper, E[·] and Cov(·;·) represent the expectation operator and the covariance operator
of random variables, respectively.Lemma 1 shows that S bears even more risk under unbundling than under
bundling if the investment level a is the same under both schemes. This result is
trivial. Since production costs cS(a;qS) and cE(a;qE) are statistically independent
in case (i), S must bear an additional risk for the product price p2 = cE(a;qE) under
unbundling.
We next characterize the equilibrium investment level under each scheme.
Let a∗ denote the equilibrium investment level in the subgame after B chooses
bundling at date 0, and a∗∗ denote that for unbundling.
Lemma 2. In the case of ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk, a∗ > a∗∗.
This result is a version of the “holdup problem”. The investment by S
is “relation-speciﬁc” because the investment is made to produce the product cus-
tomized for B. Under bundling, S can capture the full beneﬁt from the relation-
speciﬁc investment, with assurance of the product price and no room for renegoti-
ation.16 However, under unbundling, an increase in investment induces aggressive
bidding by E because of the positive externality for the production cost of E. Owing
to the reduction in price
¶cE(a;qE)
¶a < 0, S has an incentive to lower the investment
level compared to bundling. If B can commit to give all the bargaining power to S
and not to switch suppliers, this underinvestment does not occur.
However, we cannot generally say whether each equilibrium investment
level is lower or higher than the efﬁcient level ˜ a because investment by S affects
the riskiness of the production costs. Lemma 4 will provide further details.




















respectively. The big bracket terms are total payments to S. B can obtain total
expected surplus from trade at the ex ante stage, so that she optimally chooses the
scheme which generates higher surplus than the other. The following proposition
shows that B always prefers bundling to unbundling.
16Assumption 1 ensures that it is common knowledge that cancellation of production or switch-
ing suppliers just after date 3 does not increase surplus. Even though renewing the initial ﬁxed-price
contract to a cost-plus contract between date 2 and 3 increases surplus, this renegotiation is impos-
sible because the production cost is unveriﬁable; see Fudenberg and Tirole (1990), Hermalin and
Katz (1991), and Edlin and Hermalin (2001).Proposition 1. In the case of ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk, for any coefﬁcient of absolute risk
aversion r, B optimally chooses bundling, which generates higher surplus than un-
bundling.
Figure 2 illustrates this result. Under unbundling, which imposes more risk
on S than bundling does, B must make a higher total payment. Therefore, in the














Figure 2: Illustration of Proposition 1.
Remark 1. If the production cost for each of S and E is his private information,
which may be plausible in the case of ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk, then the equilibrium out-
come of a ﬁrst-price auction under unbundling changes. In this situation, S has no
incentive to make a lower bid than the minimum of E’s production cost cE(a;q); S
can win with probability one by bidding this minimum cost provided that E never
makes a lower bid than his own production cost. S may, however, have an incentive
to make a higher bid than the minimum cost cE(a;q) in order to raise a winning
price at the expense of winning for sure.
Nevertheless, if S has a sufﬁcient advantage in production over E, so that
given the investment level a the maximum of S’s production cost cS(a; ¯ q) is suf-
ﬁciently lower than the minimum of E’s production cost cE(a;q), we can obtain
the same result as Proposition 1 with some assumptions. With these assumptions,
S optimally makes a bid equal to cE(a;q) regardless of his own production cost
cS(a;qS). The winning price cE(a;q) then depends only on a, not on qE, so that
under unbundling S bears no additional risk for the product price but he still has an
incentive to underinvest. The Appendix provides formal statements and proofs.3.2 The case of aggregate risk
In this subsection, we consider case (ii). In the same way as for case (i), we char-
acterize the risk premium for S and the equilibrium investment levels a∗ and a∗∗ in
the following lemmas.17
Lemma 3. Let r be S’s risk premium for p =(p1+p2)−y(a)−cS(a;qS), and r′ be
that for p′ = (p′
1+cE(a′;qE))−y(a′)−cS(a′;qS). Then, in the case of aggregate
risk, r > r′ = 0.
Under bundling, in which prices are ﬁxed in advance, S must bear all pro-
duction cost risks. On the other hand, the assumption for the case of aggregate risk
ensures that under unbundling the contract price p2 = cE(a;qE) is determined to
eliminate the risk that S must bear; when his production cost is high (low), the cost
for his competitor E is also high (low), so that S can (must) submit a high (low) bid.
Lemma 4. In the case of aggregate risk, a∗∗ < ˜ a. Regardless of the cases,
a∗ > ˜ a if −
¶cS(a;qS)
¶a
is increasing in qS; (1)
a∗ = ˜ a if −
¶cS(a;qS)
¶a
is independent of qS; (2)
a∗ < ˜ a if −
¶cS(a;qS)
¶a
is decreasing in qS: (3)
Under bundling, S has an incentive to decrease risk in production cost. If
condition (1) (condition (3)) is satisﬁed, then an increase in investment changes
the distribution of his production cost to a less (more) risky one, so that S has an
incentive to overinvest (underinvest) compared to the efﬁcient level. If condition (2)
is satisﬁed, so that an increase in investment only changes the expectation for the
production cost of S, then there are no such distortions because of a CARA utility
function. On the other hand, under unbundling, S bears no risk, as explained in
Lemma 3; once again, underinvestment occurs owing to the holdup problem.
The following proposition presents the main result. To specify the supre-
mum of the total payment under bundling, let ¯ a∗ denote the optimal investment
level for the inﬁnitely risk-averse S under that scheme; the Appendix shows that
¯ a∗ = argmina[y(a)+cS(a; ¯ q)] and the supremum of the total payment is y(¯ a∗)+
cS(¯ a∗; ¯ q).
Proposition 2. Consider the case of aggregate risk. If y(¯ a∗)+cS(¯ a∗; ¯ q)≤y(a∗∗)+
E[cS(a∗∗;qS)], then B optimally chooses bundling. Otherwise, there exists a thresh-
old ˆ r > 0 such that B optimally chooses bundling for all r < ˆ r, and unbundling for
17With an abuse of notation, we denote the risk premium, the equilibrium investment level, and
the equilibrium payoff for B by the same notations as case (i).all r > ˆ r. B optimally chooses the scheme which generates higher surplus than the
other scheme.
Figure 3 illustrates this result. Under unbundling, while S is free from risk
and thus B only pays the expected total cost y(a∗∗)+E[cS(a∗∗;qS)], the investment
level a∗∗ is lower than the efﬁcient level. Under bundling, as S is more risk-averse,
B must pay a higher risk premium to induce S to participate in this trade. In par-
ticular, if S is inﬁnitely risk-averse, then B must compensate the highest production
cost cS(¯ a∗; ¯ q) as if B faced a limited liability constraint. Therefore, in the case of
aggregate risk, if the externality on the production cost for E is sufﬁciently low
that under unbundling S optimally chooses an investment level close to the efﬁcient
level, then B optimally chooses unbundling for sufﬁciently large r. As the degree of
externality decreases, the threshold ˆ r monotonically decreases. Clearly, when there
is no externality (
¶cE(a;qE)
¶a = 0), S optimally chooses the efﬁcient investment level




























Figure 3: Illustration of Proposition 2.
Remark 2. In the case of aggregate risk, even if the production cost for each of S and
E is his private information, the equilibrium outcome of a ﬁrst-price auction under
unbundling does not change. Since their production costs have a perfect positive
correlation in this case, each of S and E can correctly infer his competitor’s pro-
duction cost from his own cost; thus, their production costs are essentially common
knowledge between S and E.
Although B does not know their production costs, she may then be able to
obtain the information by using some mechanisms. For instance, B can require E
to report his production cost in order to know S’s production cost, and then award
a production contract to S without any information rent.18 E then plays a role in
18In this mechanism, E is indifferent among all reports, so that there are multiple equilibria. More
complex mechanisms may be able to resolve this problem.“auditing”.19 Moreover, E can correctly infer the investment level from both his
production cost cE(a;qE) and the realization of qE because his production cost is
monotonic in qE. Under unbundling, B can then obtain the ﬁrst-best payoff with
some mechanisms because the investment level and the production cost can be in-
directly veriﬁable using messages reported by S and E.
Even if these mechanisms are feasible at date 4 under unbundling, when B
cannot commit to use them in an initial contract, we can obtain the qualitatively
similar result to Proposition 2. Under these mechanisms, B pays only the realized
production cost cS(a;qS) to S; S then becomes free from risk, but has no incentive
for investment. We can interpret these mechanisms as the most severe opportunistic
behavior by B. Thus, comparing the expected payment y(0)+E[cS(0;qS)] under
unbundling with the supremum payment y(¯ a∗)+cS(¯ a∗; ¯ q) under bundling, we ob-
tain the similar statement to Proposition 2.
4 Discussion
Our ﬁndings shed light on when each scheme should be chosen in private-sector or
public-sector procurement. From Propositions 1 and 2, we can expect that buyers
are more likely to rely on unbundling than bundling in periods of aggregate shocks.
Thus, there should be a positive correlation between the choice of unbundling and
the volatility of material prices or wages.
To discuss the possibility, we focus on the construction of petrochemical
plants.20 In Japan, there are three large engineering companies, JGC Corporation,
Chiyoda Corporation, and Toyo Engineering Corporation. These companies has
carried out many projects in Asia, Africa, South America, Eastern Europe, the Mid-
dleEast, andsoon. Theschemeofturnkey, whichhadbeenprevalentsince1930sin
the U.S., was introduced to Japan in the 1950s. In their projects, lump-sum turnkey
(bundling) contracts have been prevalent.
Their businesses, however, tremendously suffered due to the oil crisis in the
1970s. Since they had been already awarded some lump-sum turnkey projects, they
inevitably experienced large cost overruns because of a substantial rise in material
prices. Although it is useful for sharing these market risks to use “ﬁxed-price with
escalation” contracts, many procurers were reluctant to use the contracts.21
19Demski et al. (1987) show the similar auditing role of second sourcing.
20See Olsen and Osmundsen (2005) for the Norwegian petroleum industry.
21FARs also prescribe “ﬁxed-price with economic price adjustment”. Crocker and Reynolds
(1993) argue that the ﬂexibility of such a contract is constrained by the requirement that the contin-
gencies and the compensation formulas must be explicitly prespeciﬁed.Thirty years after, this industry was again hit by a steep rise in global mate-
rial prices and workers’ wages. Figure 4 provides the price chart of steel materials.
The main reason behind the rise from 2003 is that there was a construction boom
in oil-producing countries and China. We can expect that during the periods when
material prices were uncertain the above Japanese companies charged high risk pre-
mia for risky lump-sum turnkey projects. Actually, Chiyoda Corporation undertook
more FEED projects from 2003 to 2004 (Chiyoda, 2009). We can guess that pro-
curers preferred unbundling to bundling in order to save risk premia.
Yen
Data source : NEEDS-Financial QUEST
(http://www.nikkei.co.jp/needs/services/fq.html)
Figure 4: Price chart of steel materials in Japan
In the model, the entrant’s identity is exogenously given. If, however, the
buyer can endogenously search an appropriate entrant in advance and credibly com-
mit to award a production contract via a ﬁrst-price auction, then the ex ante efﬁcient
outcome is realized. That is, the buyer needs to ﬁnd the entrant (or the second
source) who confronts aggregate risk but obtains no beneﬁt from the supplier’s in-
vestment. With this credible commitment, the supplier requires no risk premium
and invests efﬁciently. Thus, this commitment by the buyer should be allowed in
order to improve efﬁciency although the activity seems anticompetitive.5 Concluding remarks
In the situation where only ﬁxed-price contracting schemes are feasible, we have
examined the issues of investment incentives and risk sharing. We compared two
schemes, bundlingandunbundling, andestablishedsufﬁcientconditionsunderwhich
each scheme generates higher surplus than the other and is chosen in equilibrium.
We have assumed that the supplier has a cost advantage over the entrant so
that the supplier can win a production contract for sure. In practice, however, there
may be more competition between them. Under the assumption that the entrant’s
production cost can be lower than the supplier (i.e., removing Assumption 1), some
new effects will emerge. If the buyer cannot switch suppliers under bundling, then
unbundling has an advantage because the buyer can switch from the inefﬁcient sup-
plier to the efﬁcient entrant. This switching effect, however, may in turn reduce the
supplier’s investment incentives and impose an additional risk on the supplier; the
supplier cannot obtain his investment beneﬁt at all with positive probability, and
he must bear the risk of losing a production contract. Although the results may be
robust to switching with a small probability, the above effects are more likely to
matter as the probability is higher. A more careful analysis will be needed.
Appendix






This follows from a simple calculation and Jensen’s inequality.
Proof of Lemma 2. The expected utility for S on choosing a at date 1 is E[1−
exp{−r[(p1 + p2)−y(a)−cS(a;qS)]}] under bundling, and E[1−exp{−r[p1 −
y(a)+cE(a;qE)−cS(a;qS)]}] under unbundling. The necessary and sufﬁcient








































by comparing (4) with (6).
















By Jensen’s inequality, 1
r ln{E[exp(−rcE(a∗∗;qE))]}+E[cE(a∗∗;qE)] > 0. In ad-
dition, a∗ = argmin{y(a) + 1
r ln{E[exp(rcS(a;qS))]}}. Therefore, EU∗∗





B for all r.
Proof of Lemma 3. Under bundling, the distribution of p = (p1 + p2)−y(a)−
cS(a;qS) is nondegenerate, so that the risk premium r for p is positive. Under
unbundling, in case (ii), because there exists a function c(a) such that cE(a′;qE) =
cS(a′;qS)+c(a′), the risk premium r′ for p′ = p′
1−y(a′)+c(a′) is zero.
Proof of Lemma 4. Thenecessaryandsufﬁcientﬁrst-orderconditionfor ˜ a=argmin[y(a)+






= y′(˜ a): (7)
Since cE(a;qE)−cS(a;qS) is independent of the realized values of (qS;qE) in case











: (8)The second term on the right-hand side of (8) is strictly positive, so we have ˜ a>a∗∗















If condition (1) (condition (3)) in Lemma 4 is satisﬁed, then the fact that the covari-
ance between two positively (negatively) covarying variates is positive (negative)
implies that the covariance term in (9) is positive (negative), so that a∗ > ˜ a (a∗ < ˜ a)
by comparing (7) with (9). If condition (2) is satisﬁed, then a∗ = ˜ a because the
covariance term in (9) is zero.
Proof of Proposition 2. As above, cE(a;qE)−cS(a;qS) is independent of the real-







Now, a∗∗ determined by (8) does not depend on r, so that EU∗∗
B does not depend on
r as well.
We then show that (a) EU∗
B converges to the ﬁrst-best payoff as r → 0, (b)
EU∗
B is decreasing in r, and (c) EU∗
B has an inﬁmum.
(a) Since the optimal investment for S depends on his coefﬁcient of absolute





mium. As r → 0, a∗(r) → ˜ a because the covariance term in (9) converges to 0, and
the risk premium r(a∗(r);r) converges to 0. Therefore, as r → 0, EU∗
B converges
to the ﬁrst-best payoff v−{y(˜ a)+E[cS(˜ a;qS)]}.





¶r . From Theorem 1 of
Pratt (1964), as the coefﬁcient of absolute risk-aversion is greater, the risk premium
is greater. Thus,
¶r(a∗(r);r)




(c) The certainty equivalent for S for p =(p1+p2)−y(a)−cS(a;qS), from





Since cS is increasing in qS, the highest production cost given a is cS(a; ¯ q). Thus, as
r → ¥, his certainty equivalent converges to (p1+ p2)−y(a)−cS(a; ¯ q). Then theinﬁnitely risk-averse S optimally chooses ¯ a∗ determined by −
¶cS(¯ a∗; ¯ q)
¶a = y′(¯ a∗).
Since lima→¥y′(a) = ¥, ¯ a∗ is ﬁnite. Therefore, as r → ¥, EU∗
B converges to v− {
y(¯ a∗)+cS(¯ a∗; ¯ q)
}





0, which is less than the ﬁrst-best payoff, completes the proof.
As noted in Remark 1, even if the production cost for each of S and E is his
private information in the case of ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk, we can obtain the same result
as Proposition 1 with some assumptions. We now prove this. The idea is based
on the Example 1 of Maskin and Riley (2000). Given the investment level a and
the realized values of (qS;qE), we use the notations cS = cS(a;qS) , cE = cE(a;qE),
¯ cS = cS(a; ¯ q), and cE = cE(a;q).
Suppose ﬁrst that E truthfully bids his production cost cE. When S’s pro-





where F is the distribution function of production cost for E. The ﬁrst-order condi-
tion is given by
exp(−r(p1−y(a)))×
{[exp(−r(p2−cS))−1]f(p2)+exp(−r(p2−cS))(1−F(p2))r} = 0; (11)
where f is the density function of production cost for E. By differentiating the left




If f′(p2) is always positive or |f′(p2)| is sufﬁciently small (e.g., uniform distri-
bution), then the formula (12) is negative and thus the second-order condition is
satisﬁed. We assume this to be the case.
Assumption 6. For all r, all p2 ∈ [cE; ¯ cE] and all cS, the formula (11) is negative.Now, 1−F(cE) = 1. Thus, if for all r, all a and all qS,
[exp(−r(cE −cS))−1]f(cE)+exp(−r(cE −cS))r ≤ 0;
then the solution to the problem (10) is always a corner solution. Since cS is in-
creasing in qS, this condition is equivalent to the condition that for all r and all
a,
[exp(−r(cE − ¯ cS))−1]f(cE)+exp(−r(cE − ¯ cS))r ≤ 0: (13)
If f(cE) is positive and cE is sufﬁciently higher than ¯ cS, then the condition (13) is
satisﬁed; this yields a corner solution. We assume this to be the case.
Assumption 7. For all r and all a, the condition (13) is satisﬁed.
Lemma 5. If Assumptions 6 and 7 are satisﬁed, then in the subgame after un-
bundling is chosen and S invests there is an equilibrium in which S makes a bid
equal to cE(a;q) regardless of his production cost and E truthfully bids his produc-
tion cost cE(a;qE).
Proof of Lemma 5. As explained above, given E’s strategy to bid his production
cost cE(a;qE), S’s best response is to bid cE(a;q) regardless of his production cost
cS(a;qS). Moreover, if S chooses this bidding strategy, then it is optimal for E to
bid cE(a;qE) because he cannot proﬁtably win the auction.
In the following we assume that in the subgame after unbundling is chosen
and S invests the equilibrium in Lemma 5 occurs, so that S wins with probability
one and the winning price is p2 = cE(a;q).
Lemma 6. Let r be S’s risk premium for p = (p1+ p2)−y(a)−cS(a;qS), and r′
be that for p′ = (p′
1 +cE(a;q))−y(a)−cS(a;qS). Then, r′ = r > 0 when the
same investment level a is chosen under both schemes.
Proof of Lemma 6. By the assumption of a CARA utility function, both r and r′
depend only on S’s production cost cS(a;qS), so that r′ = r > 0.
Lemma 7. a∗ > a∗∗.
Proof of Lemma 7. The necessary and sufﬁcient ﬁrst-order condition for a∗ is given













We have a∗ > a∗∗ by comparing (4) with (14).Proposition 3. For any coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion r, B optimally chooses
bundling, which generates higher surplus than unbundling.











Since a∗ = argmin{y(a)+ 1
r ln{E[exp(rcS(a;qS))]}}, EU∗∗
B < EU∗
B for all r.
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